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Abstract 
In 2007, both Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities took firm steps to reduce 
corruption along the Transdnistrian border. This paper – aimed mainly at anti-
corruption practitioners and scholars in public administration – discusses the 
background and underlying principles guiding the anti-corruption work being 
adopted by both governments in order to facilitate discussion about optimal anti-
corruption programme design. This paper presents a set of tools used during the 
planning phase of the anti-corruption programme — outlining the methodology 
used to assess the extent of corruption on the Transdnistrian border, the problems 
of legislative transplants, a “contract test” for defining corruption offenses, a 
method of risk analysis, and a model of optimal anti-corruption programme 
organizational design.  
 
 
 
THIS PAPER IS A DRAFT AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE 
PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS PAPER.   2
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Introduction 
 
Government services in both Ukraine and Moldova are widely perceived to be 
corrupt and inefficient. These perceptions appear, at first glance, broadly supported by 
data compiled by the World Bank.
2 Figure 1 shows the results of a survey which 
measures the effectiveness of government to engage in public sector activities. The 
Figure shows that Ukrainian and Moldovan government services are, according to the 
survey data, more effective than most Former Soviet countries — but much less effective 
than their Eastern European counterparts in countries such as Poland and the Czech 
Republic. One implication of relatively low government effectiveness has been an 
inability to control corruption. Looking at control of corruption indicators shown in 
Figure 2, Ukraine and Moldova are roughly as capable (or slightly more capable) in 
fighting corruption than other former Soviet Union countries — but much less able to 
control of corruption than the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Figure 1: Moldovan and Ukrainian "Government 
Effectiveness" Compared with Other Countries
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Figure 2: Comparing Ukraine and Moldova's "Control 
of Corruption" with Other Countries
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This article attempts to provide an academic background on practitioner work in 
designing an anti-corruption programme at the Transdnistrian border – allowing the 
reader to “look under the hood” of an anti-corruption programme and see some of the 
                                                 
1 The following article draws upon the authors’ experiences while working for the European Union Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Odessa, Ukraine in 2007 as an independent/external expert. All the data 
are drawn from public sources. The views in this paper remain my own and do not represent the views of 
the EUBAM or the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments. None of the material in this paper can be 
construed as representing a position on the diplomatic situation surrounding Transdnistria (as we have no 
view on this situation).  
2 These data, like other data such as Transparency International’s cross-country index of corruption 
perceptions represent a computed summary measure from several perceptions surveys. While the World 
Bank estimates use more complicated statistical procedures, these numbers still only represent levels of 
corruption as perceived by survey respondents.  See Kaufmann et al. (2006) for more on the methodology. 
See Galtung and Stamford (2003) for more on the strengths and weaknesses of various empirical methods 
of measuring corruption.   3
academic considerations in anti-corruption programme design.
3 The first part of this 
article will provide an estimate of the scale of corruption along the Transdnistrian border 
– showing an economic methodology used to estimate corruption in two particular 
services – border guard and customs — in Ukraine and Moldova. The second part of the 
article presents the problems with current anti-corruption programme design (particularly 
those relying on legislative changes and Action Plans). To prepare for a greater role of 
administrative sanctions (instead of criminal sanctions) against corruption, the paper 
discusses the “contract test” for corruption. The third part of the article discusses a risk-
management approach to fighting corruption – showing how authorities can fight 
corruption without increasing the regulatory burden which actually increases corruption. 
The fourth part of the article discusses the optimal “location” (within the public sector) of 
anti-corruption work in a public sector – namely the decision taken by government 
authorities and advisors where to base legal responsibility for fighting corruption. The 
final section concludes by raising questions for further research.  
 
This paper discusses the fight against corruption focusing on two specific 
government services – the border guard service and customs service – in Ukraine and 
Moldova; in a very specific geographical region – the Transdnistrian region. At the time 
of this writing, the political situation surrounding the geographical area between the 
Dniestr River and the Ukrainian border remained uncertain (as will be briefly discussed 
in this article). For the purposes of this article, Transdnistria shall refer to the region in 
along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border and not to the political entity occupying the 
Transdnistrian area.  
Overview of the Transdnistrian Region  
 
  The Transdnistrian area is situated along a significant proportion of the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border. In 2006, more people and goods flowed from Ukraine to 
Moldova than vice-versa. In 2006, roughly 7.5 million people crossed the border from 
Ukraine into Moldova, while 5.8 million people crossed the border from Moldova into 
Ukraine. Figure 3 shows the level of trade between these two countries – and goods are 
either transported in trucks and cars across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border or by plane. 
Both countries also serve as important crossing through points for goods in transit on 
route to other countries.
4 Trade with both Ukrainian and Moldovan businesses is highly 
regulated, creating incentives to pay bribes in order to circumvent trade restrictions as 
will be discussed later in this paper. As can be seen from Figure 4, the number of 
regulations required to engage in international trade is higher in these two countries than 
in OECD countries (though lower than in many Former Soviet countries).  
 
                                                 
3 As a contribution to the anti-corruption literature, the material in this paper naturally does not represent all 
the considerations of the Transdnistrian programme or suggests that the advisors slavishly followed theory 
in designing the programme. 
4 Due to the difficulty in estimating the volume or value of this trade, such traffic is not considered in this 
paper.    4
Figure 3: Level of trade between Ukraine and 
Moldova in USD
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Figure 4: Trade Barriers Affecting Ukraine and 
Moldova
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  The red area in Figure 5 represents the 
area disputed between the Moldovan 
government and the authorities of the 
Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic based in 
Tiraspol (TMR).
5 The existence of this semi-
automonous area has created a unique 
situation – from an anti-corruption point of 
view – because the region has often been 
referred to as a “black hole” for the trafficking 
of people, arms, narcotics and goods for resale 
(Socor, 2006). Reliable estimates put black 
market activity in the region at roughly $250 
million (CISR, 2003).
6  Reliable information 
also suggests that Transdnistrian companies 
are engaging in fraudulent re-export – 
importing products from outside Moldova and 
then falsifying documents of Moldovan origin 
in order to take advantage of lower tariff rates 
between Moldova and Ukraine.
7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the extent of 
administrative corruption in the Transdnistrian territory is extremely high, compared to 
corruption levels in either Ukraine or Moldova – in effect representing a pool of 
individuals and resources willing and able to corrupt officials on either side of the 
territory. In one view, the Transnisitrian authorities have been facilitating the traffic of 
contraband in order to finance their military activities aimed at independence. However, 
this view has recently been contested by independent observers who note that previous 
estimates of black market activity have been exaggerated.
 8   
 
                                                 
5 Many transliterations of Transdnistria are widely used, including Transnistria, Transdniestria and 
Pridnestovia (as this area is sometimes referred to as the Pridnestovian Moldovan Republic or PMR).    
6 The CISR (2003) estimates that, given the economic sanctions being imposed on Transdnistria, up to 50% 
of officially reported GDP is involved in the black market. In 2005, according to the same source, GDP in 
the region was $500 million.   
7 These schemes are both variegated and often complex. One example of such a scheme is the illegal 
transport of goods to duty-free zones in Moldova were these products are labeled as duty-free production 
and then re-exported to their original country of origin (often Ukraine)! The EUBAM website 
(www.eubam.org) provides this and other information.  
8 For an unbiased and highly readable analysis of Transniestrian situation (and the possible responses by 
the EU and the EUBAM, see International Crisis Group (2006).  See Almond (2006) for another critique of 
the media assertions of high rates of criminality and smuggling in the Transdnistrian region.    5
  Irregardless of Transdnistria’s diplomatic position, the existence of this semi-
regulated territory wedged between Ukraine and Moldova has resulted in several 
distortions in the trade environment. First, a cordon sanitaire has been established in 
Moldova, along the Dniestr River, consisting of internal customs inspectors responsible 
for inspecting goods and people coming into other parts of Moldova from the 
Transdnistrian region. Second, in order to ensure that Transdnistria based companies are 
regulated according to international standards, third-party countries such as Ukraine insist 
that Transdnistrian companies exporting abroad must have a Moldovan certificate of 
registration – obtainable in Chisinau (the capitol of Moldova). Third, and partially as a 
continuation of Soviet practice, both Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities engage in 
100% inspection of goods and individuals crossing the border. Such intense inspection 
results in significant economic losses in time spent at the border, administrative delays 
and disincentives for engaging in international trade.  
Estimating the Level of Corruption  
 
Corruption, particularly the payment of bribes, occurs when a private individual 
interacts with a government official.
9 Such interaction with government officials in the 
Transdnistrian region primarily occurs as border crossers interact with customs officers 
or border guards.
10 Customs services in Moldova and Ukraine are responsible for 
collecting taxes on particular types of goods, as well as ensuring that importers and 
exporters follow import/export procedures. Customs officials are also responsible for 
ensuring that contraband (such as weapons, drugs, and generally prohibited goods and 
materials) does not enter the country. The border guard service checks passports (to 
ensure that the individual entering the country has the legal right to enter) as well as 
patrols border crossing points and the “wild” border (known as green borders on land and 
blue borders at sea) to ensure that individuals are not illegally entering the country. Any 
time an importer or an individual entering the country wishes to contravene national 
regulations, they can bribe customs and border guard officials.  
 
From the reports and survey information available, corruption particularly 
affecting the Ukrainian/Moldovan border is relatively modest by national standards 
(though excessive by European Union standards). While direct measurement of 
corruption is difficult, indirect measurements are often used to point out obvious 
problems with customs and border guard service delivery – as corruption is often either a 
symptom of poor service delivery, or concomitant with poor service delivery. Slow and 
unhelpful administration often results in corruption. As shown in Figure 6, roughly 35% 
of Moldovan respondents in a business survey reported by Carasciuc (2005) noted that 
they had to give a bribe every time they crossed the border (with roughly the same 
amount of respondents noting that they never needed to pay bribes). In exchange for 
those payments, as shown in Figure 6, the majority of border crossers received faster 
processing times, and one-third received a “better” classification of goods. More 
worryingly, in 14% of the cases, business representatives faced coercion – having “no 
other choice” but to pay bribes. 
                                                 
9 The canonical definition of corruption involves the “use of public power by a government official for a 
private gain” A defense of this definition is presented later in this paper.  
10 In practice, several other government departments may be present at the border, including health and 
sanitary inspections and veterinary services.     6
Figure 8: Percent of Survey Respondents 
Thinking Corruption is a Serious Problem
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Figure 6: Bribe/Gift giving on the Moldovan 
Border in 2006
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Figure 7: Benefit for Bribing Moldovan Customs Officials 
in 2006
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Source: Carasciuc (2006)  
 
Survey data covering trade-related corruption among Ukrainian business people 
are much more difficult to obtain.
11 Figure 8 shows popular perceptions of corruption in a 
number of government services.
12 As shown in the Figure, 64% of respondents think that 
corruption represents a “serious” problem 
(as stated in the survey) whereas almost 80% 
of respondents thought corruption in 
hospitals represented a serious problem.
13  
 
Corruption has a negative impact on 
both public revenue and economic 
development. According to the Carasciuc 
(2005) study, in Moldova, the average size 
of a bribe paid to a customs official is $32 
(staying the same amount in 2002 as 2006). 
Border guards asked for – on average — $17 (remaining also at the same level from 2002 
to 2006). According to Government of Moldova data, 5.8 million people crossed the 
border from Moldova into Ukraine. Based on international evidence, at least 5% of 
border crossers may be required to pay bribes. Thus, if Moldova conforms to other 
countries, $4.9 million in bribes were paid to Moldovan border guard. Assuming that the 
                                                 
11 Several USAID financed reports attempt to assess the level of corruption in Ukraine (Spector et al., 
2005; Black and Blue, 2005). As the report authors are known experts in the anti-corruption field, the 
abstract, generalized and highly jargon-laid nature of these reports can probably be attributed to the funder 
(USAID). See SIGMA (2006) for a comprehensive governance assessment. SPAI (2002) provides an 
assessment of Moldova’s anti-corruption programme.  
12 According to a survey taken in 2003 under the Partnership for a Transparent Society Program, 75% of 
respondents believed corruption to be very widespread in the Ukrainian central government, while 62% 
indicated they had actual personal encounters with corrupt officials over the previous five years. This 
corresponds roughly with perceptions surveys from other EU countries. For example, Rudzitis (2002) cites 
survey evidence showing that 73% of survey respondents thought the Lithuanian customs service was 
dishonest but only 5% having actually paid a bribe to the survice. Kouzmina (2006) provides data from the 
Russian Federation showing that customs clearance delays are roughly on par with those of Ukraine and 
Moldova.  
13 These data contrast resoundingly with data from most Central and Eastern European countries. For 
example, in recent data looking at corruption perceptions in Romania, the largest number of respondents 
(66%) thought that in the customs service, “all or almost all officials in the agency are corrupt” – as 
opposed to 55% for police and 54% for the health service.    7
bribe on the Ukrainian side is the same, and that 7.5 million people crossed from Ukraine 
into Moldova, then the total amount paid in bribes is $6.4 million.   
 
Indirectly, the level of corruption can be estimated from the level of trade between 
Moldova and Ukraine as well as estimates from businesses about their “bribe tax” (or the 
proportion of the value of their trade and/or sales) which is collected in the form of bribes 
– 20% of firms estimate that 2% of the value of their trade is subject to a “bribery tax.”
14 
Given a base of $480 million in exports from Ukraine to Moldova, $1.9 million in 
customs is paid in bribes in Moldova for Ukrainian-origin goods. According to the World 
Bank (2005c), 15% of firms note that they pay an average of 1.5% of the value of their 
merchandise on a “bribery tax.” As also shown in Figure 3, for a base of $100 million in 
trade between the two countries, the amount of customs bribes is a minimum of $225,000 
in Ukraine for Moldovan-origin goods.
15  
 
These estimates, however, underestimate the extent of corruption along the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border, because they do not take into account unreported activities 
(from persons crossing the border to the value of goods not reported in the official 
statistics). In order to estimate corruption involving these unreported activities, corruption 
“risk” needs to be calculated as the probability of each unreported event occurring 
multiplied by the number of times it occurs.
16 Taking Carasciuc’s (2005) estimates of the 
average bribe level for customs and border guard officials, and other estimates related to 
the proportion of under-valuation of goods at least $30 million in trade taxes is not 
collected by Ukrainian officials for goods from Moldova in route to Ukraine.
17 Similarly, 
roughly $110 million in trade taxes is not collected by Moldovan officials for goods from 
Ukraine heading to Moldovan markets. The value of this bribe tax is much larger for 
Moldova than for Ukraine (which is a much larger economy) because Moldova imports 
much more from Ukraine than vice-versa.   
 
Some corruption is most likely tied to illegal activity.
18 Figure 9 provides a brief 
rough estimate of the scale of corruption tied to black market activities related to the 
traffic in narcotics, weapons, and humans. According to publicly available sources, the 
total estimated amount of heroine flowing through Ukraine in destination to Western 
                                                 
14 See World Bank (2005b) for estimates for the bribe tax in Ukraine.  
15 The higher level of bribes for Moldova, which is a much poorer country than Ukraine, may seem unusual 
at first. However, the higher level is due to the much larger absolute level of imports into Moldova from 
Ukraine. As a check, the estimated levels of corruption affecting Moldova and Ukraine were compared 
with other corruption estimates related the level of overall corruption to GDP – see Carasciuc (2004) for 
Moldova and Gorodnichenko and Peter (2006) for Ukraine.  
16 The calculation involves the most basic math. A probability (p) of an event, such as someone paying a 
border guard officer to allow an illegal crossing across a green border can be estimated, however rudely. 
The estimated amount of money involved in a corrupt transaction can be denoted as X, multiplied by the 
probability of the occurrence p results in a risk of a single unreported event as pX.  For the reader with a 
background in mathematics, the computation of the total yearly risk is equal to the probability of an 
occurrence of corruption at any particular site is ΣjΣi(piXi) where i=number of sites and j=the number of 
time periods or trails.   
17 For a similarly minded (though more technically complicated) calculation of the size of bribery in 
Ukraine, see Gorodnichenko and Peter (2006) who estimate the total value of bribery in Ukraine at between 
460 and 580 million USD.  
18 The relationship between corruption and contraband is complicated – with several officials noting that no 
direct evidence of corruption related to contraband can be found: 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/05f3742a-1c2d-4e1a-a57f-0e9780549795.html    8
European markets is 23.1 metric tonnes at a market price of $78 per gram results (with 
roughly 1 million grams per ton) in a market value transited through Ukraine of $1.8 
billion.
19 If the bribery tax previously referred to covers illegal transit of narcotics, then 
the value of these bribes equals $18 million. With regard to arms, Figure 9 cites studies 
estimating that, in the 1990s, roughly $5.3 billion in arms left the Ukraine. If the same 
bribery tax applies to guns, then the value involved in arms-trade related corruption 
equals to $106 million. If the actual current value is even 10% of the 1990s value, then 
the likely value is $10.6 million.
20  
 
Figure 9: Contraband and Estimated Corruption Value 
 
Contraband item  Amount  Price per unit  Total 
estimated 
Estimated 
bribes to 
facilitate trade 
Information 
source 
Ukraine          
Drugs (heroin)  23.1 metric 
tons (transit) 
$78 per gram  $1.8 
billion 
$18 million  Layne 
(2001) for 
amount and 
UN (2005). 
Guns N/A  N/A  $5.3 
billion 
$10.6 million  Kuzio 
(2002) 
People N/A  N/A N/A  N/A  N/A 
Sources where cited. Estimated bribe revenue derives from World Bank estimates of the “bribe tax” previously mentioned in the text. 
Data are unavailable for Moldova.  
 
  The economic logic underpinning these specific calculations is described in 
Figure 11. However, the economic impacts are much larger in a number of ways. First, 
the reader having taken a course in international economics will immediately recognize 
that the bribe serves as a trade tax – decreasing wages in Moldova and the return of 
capital in Ukraine (assuming Ukraine is the relatively capital-intensive trading partner). 
Second, the reader versed in Keynesian macroeconomics – and particularly the 
Keynesian multiplier — will immediately recognize that a bribe which equals 5% of the 
value of the goods in any small closed economy (such as Moldova) will decrease overall 
economic activity by 20% or more (in the case of Moldova).
21 Third, a reader versed in 
public economics will recognize that a 5% bribe will result in 25% loss in welfare in a 
particular market. 
                                                 
19 Heroin Market Value Figure:  United   Nations, 2005. World Drug Report. Vienna: Office on Drugs and 
Crime, June 2005, p. 132, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html  
20 Sources about contraband in Moldova provide much less reliable results. According to the UNODC 
(2005), roughly 0.1% of the Moldovan population uses cocaine (as opposed to 0.8% of the Ukrainian 
population). Given a population base of 4.5 million people, the average estimated number of people, using 
cocaine equals 45,000 individuals.  
21 The economic distortion caused by a bribe tax naturally depends on the level of other taxes in the 
economy. The estimate provided in the text signifies that as the effective overall tax rate on Moldovan 
enterprises increases from 20% to 25%, the long-run value of goods and services produced in the economy 
is expected to fall by 20%. Because this is not a treatise in introductory macroeconomics, we do not specify 
further how these results are calculated.    9
 
 
Figure 10: An Economic Calculation of Corruption along the Transdnistrian 
Border 
 
Estimates involving the value of corruption in international trade are always 
difficult to obtain because parties to corruption have little incentive to disclose their 
activities to third parties. However, approximations can be made.
22 For example, as 
previously noted, survey data (from World Bank (2003), can reasonably reliably estimate 
the value of traders’ goods paid in bribes. A “bribe tax” (denoted by b) may affect a value 
of normal consumer goods flowing across a border in any particular year (Xt).
23 The 
payment of bribes is an obvious economic harm to traders (though from an economist’s 
point of view, bribes often represent a simple redistribution of national income). Bribes 
are often paid, following economic incentives, to provide traders with an economic 
advantage – such as lower taxes which result from under-valuation or mis-categorising of 
goods. If Xt represents the true value of goods and Xr represents the reported value of 
goods, then the State budget clearly loses the tax (t expressed as a percentage) of the 
difference between the reported value and the true value.
24  
 
However, the real harm to corruption at the border occurs for two reasons. First, 
the value of production may be affected as traders divert a fraction of their overall 
production into other activities (δ) – as businessmen substitute out of activities where 
bribes are sought into other economic activities. Offsetting this loss are the gains from 
faster trade and lower taxes which encourage producers to increase by a fraction their 
production (c). Second, corruption in legal goods (like potatoes) often encourages – or at 
least occurs in parallel with — trade in illegal goods (like contraband). If θ represents 
fraction of contraband goods which are traded in relation to normal consumer goods, then 
the total loss to budget (as these goods as are not taxes) is θXt.
25 
 
Combining these terms results in an overall estimate for the loss due to corruption 
at: 
 
                         Corruption Loss = bXt + t(Xt – Xr) + (δ-c)(X*-Xt) + θXt 
 
Of course, this estimate does not incorporate the social and other harms often referred to 
by academics and policymakers. 
                                                 
22 Rose-Ackermann (1999) represents a useful vade-mecum for the economic rationale behind corruption.  
21 These normal consumer goods are contrasted with contraband goods. The previously given formula — 
ΣjΣi(piXi) where i=number of sites and j=the number of time periods or trails – can be used as a micro-
economic check on this, fundamentally macroeconomic estimate.   
24 The bribe tax, and the undervaluation estimate, assumes that the civil servant knows the true value of 
goods. Such an assumption is obvious because if the civil servant did not know the true value, he or she 
would have accepted the value claimed by the trader and no need for a bribe would arise.  
25 Indeed, the social harm is higher and can be calculated roughly as the value of earning lost for lives taken 
by guns and drug addiction.    10
Problems of Anti-Corruption Legislation and Action Planning  
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, a large amount of activity has focused on the 
adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption law which criminalizes bribery and 
facilitates the elaboration of a national anti-corruption Action Plan. Both Ukraine and 
Moldova have anti-corruption laws which criminalize bribery and have adopted multi-
year anti-corruption Action Plans. In Ukraine the Ministry of Interior has been charged to 
elaborate an Anti-Corruption Action Plan covering the entire executive, for 
implementation by 27th of February 2007.
26 Moldova has adopted a multi-year National 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan (until 2008) which covers all the major services. In both 
Ukraine and Moldova, customs and border guard services have been tasked with 
elaborating department specific instructions aimed at implementing the anti-corruption 
law and the national anti-corruption Action Plan.
27  
 
A large amount of donor assistance has been committed by foreign donors – 
particularly USAID and the OECD – aimed at improving the quality of anti-corruption 
legislation in both countries.
28 Judging the quality of legislation is difficult – particularly 
in the area of anti-corruption where no set of practices has been shown definitely to be 
more effective than other practices.
29 However, an obvious metric by which to assess the 
quality of legislation and/or implementing regulation must depend on its purely technical 
aspects. Following Michael (2004), one way of assessing the quality of anti-corruption 
legislation and regulations depends on its specificity and relevance. Specificity refers to 
the extent to which legislation refers to concrete practices instead of abstract principles 
and answers the four journalist questions (who is affected, what is involved, when are 
actions to be carried out, and how are these activities to be undertaken). Second, in both 
the practitioner and academic literature, a very wide array of factors have been linked to 
the level of corruption in an administration (from the motivation of staff to national 
culture). Yet, some factors relate more directly to fighting corruption – as opposed to 
other areas of activity such as civil service reform – and thus are classified by their 
relevance to the anti-corruption programme.   
 
Figure 11 provides an assessment of the national anti-corruption Action Plans. As 
shown, the quality of the actual legislation seeking to prevent corruption is relatively 
immaterial because the plans aiming to implement the law are highly non-specific and 
irrelevant. In the case of Ukraine, its national plan is significantly more abstract than 
Moldova’s plan. However, the international advisors previously working with these 
                                                 
26 Indeed, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine has elaborated an Action Plan with 
monitoring mechanisms, actions to prevent corruption focused on the finance of political activity and the 
approximation of legislation to EU standards (which in this case revolves around compliance with the 
OECD and CoE conventions).  
27 For the reader unfamiliar with administrative procedure, national laws passed by the parliament – and in 
some countries by Presidential degree — often give general instructions. Departments are subsequently 
responsible to devising internal regulations aimed at implementing these broad legislative projects.  
28 Unlike other expert reports, this report will try to avoid to the extent possible a discussion of regulations 
– preferring to focus on actual work practices for two reasons. First, as noted by a recent OECD evaluation, 
“while Ukraine has a rich array of legal instruments and broad strategic documents, efficient coordination, 
implementation and enforcement remain insufficient” (2). Second, specific regulatory deficiencies and 
recommendations for improvement are being made directly with the counterpart agencies.   
29 A number of authors bemoan the lack of success in anti-corruption work. See Kaufmann (2006) for an 
empirical treatment of the anti-corruption industry’s progress.     11
countries are partly to blame. As also shown in Figure 11, the recommendations for 
reform offered by organizations such as the OECD and the Asian Development Bank in 
their Action Plans for the region are also relatively general.
30  
 
     Figure 11: Assessing the Quality of Anti-Corruption Action Plans  
 
Country  Specificity   Relevance 
Ukraine 2.3  3.4 
Moldova 3.9  4.1 
Kosovo 1.8  3.2 
Romania 2.6  3.8 
ADB-OECD 1.9  3.6 
OECD/Istanbul 1.4 3.2 
     
         Source: author. (one is the lowest score and five is the highest). See Michael (2004) for a detailed 
         computation of these scores and a further discussion of the methodology.  
 
  An obvious – though wrong – implication of this discussion is that anti-corruption 
legislation and implementing regulations need to be strengthened. However, the adoption 
of anti-corruption conventions and work on national anti-corruption programmes do not 
correlate to more effective action against corruption. Stevens and Rousso (2003) – using 
econometric analysis – investigate whether the adoption of anti-corruption legislation 
affects the level of corruption in country (as proxied by individual’s perceptions of the 
level of corruption). They specifically define three variables aimed at measuring the 
legislative environment surrounding the fight against corruption. First, they measure the 
adoption of “omnibus” activities (the adoption of a national anti-corruption plan which 
involved NGOs and multiple branches of the executive), the development of a national 
anti-corruption Action Plan, and the creation of an anti-corruption agency. Second, they 
measure the ratification of legal frameworks, specifically a civil service law, a financial 
disclosure law for civil servants and/or politicians, a freedom of information law, a law 
on political party finance, and an anti money laundering law. Third, they measure 
membership to international conventions including the Stability Pact, the OECD 
Convention and the Council of Europe’s four conventions against corruption. Figure 12 
shows some of the many variables in their analysis – pointing to the fact that legal 
adoption has a statistically significant correlation with reductions in perceived corruption 
— though the adoption of national Action Plans or work in international consultative 
committees does not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Michael and Bowser (2005) cover the problems with the OECD’s work in the area as part of its Anti-
Corruption Network for Transition Economies. Most advisors in the region have indicated that the OECD’s 
working methods, in the cover of the Network, have resulted in expensive and ineffective assessment. The 
work of the Network will certainly either be devolved to SIGMA (also in the OECD), to the EU or 
discontinued.    12
Figure 12: Selected Regression Coefficients from Stevens and Rousso (2003) 
 
   Bribe tax (f')  Bribe tax (df/dt)  Bribe customs (df/dt)  Bribe courts (df/dt) 
Omnibus             
Legal     X  X  X 
Conventions            
 
  Such results are worrisome because the adoption of national anti-corruption laws, 
especially those which criminalize corruption offenses as recommended by conventions 
promulgated by the OECD and the Council of Europe are often used as a measure of the 
strength of anti-corruption legislation. These conventions call for the establishment of 
criminal rather than simply administrative or civil liability for corruption offenses by civil 
servants. Ostensibly, the more severe criminal remedies — proposed by model laws such 
as the OECD Convention — provide greater deterrence for engaging in corruption. While 
implementation of the criminal responsibility foreseen in the OECD Anti-Corruption 
Convention (and thus the acquis communautaire) is laudable, criminal responsibility for 
corruption may reduce the incentive to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption in 
Ukraine and Moldova for two reasons.
31  
 
However, the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by Ukraine and 
Moldova poses problems.
32 First, the Ukrainian and Moldovan Ministries of Justice can 
not be relied upon to successfully prosecute criminal cases of corruption given severe 
resource constraints and corruption endemic within their own services.
33 Second, as 
superiors are legally and administrative responsible for the corrupt activities of their sub-
ordinates, they have been unwilling to strenuously investigate – in order to avoid 
prosecution themselves! Third, the level of proof required for a successful criminal 
conviction reduces greatly the range of cases which may be pursued. Administrative 
sanctions against corruption based on “balance of probabilities” standard for successful 
conviction can – in certain circumstances – provide greater deterrence against corruption 
than the ostensibly strong criminal standard which requires proof “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”
34 
 
In both Ukraine and Moldova, administrative sanctions should be strengthened 
against corruption – starting with work on teaching civil servants to recognize corruption 
                                                 
31 EU Member States in adopting the acquis communautaire, ratify legislation aimed at fighting corruption. 
However, the acquis only requires EU Member States to ratify the OECD Convention on Bribery of 
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and the Council of Europe Conventions (ETS 173 
and ETS 174 which establish criminal and civil liability for corruption offenses).     
32 While the adoption of the criminal sanctions embodied in the OECD Convention may negatively impact 
on Ukraine and Moldova’s ability to detect and prosecute corruption cases, the existence of the Convention 
itself will certainly help both governments fight corruption. Under the OECD, businessmen from OECD 
countries who bribe Ukrainian or Moldovan officials are committing a crime in their home countries.  
33 The weaknesses in the judicial systems of both countries is covered in the literature previously cited.  
34 In most EU countries, the accuser of a corruption offense has the burden of proof. In the UK, the burden 
of proof is reversed – namely the civil servant has the duty to show he or she did not participate in 
corruption. While the reversal of the burden of proof for allegations of administrative corruption are not 
appropriate to Ukraine and Moldova, the UK experience shows that reducing the required standard of proof 
may serve to deter corruption.    13
offenses. Figure 13 provides an administrative test which may help civil servants work on 
the difference between corruption and gift-giving.  
 
Figure 13: The Definition of Corruption and the “Contract Test” 
 
  The definition of corruption has been debated.
35 While in the 1990s, the standard 
definition of corruption was “the (mis)use of public power for private gain”, more recent 
definitions – particularly promulgated by the international non-governmental organization 
Transparency International — have encapsulated “the misuse of entrusted power” either in the 
public or private sector. Such a definition has gained a large amount of credibility in policy 
circles given Transparency International’s large PR activity and close relationship with a number 
of international organizations and national governments.  
 
Such a definition of corruption should be avoided for three reasons. First, such a wide 
definition of corruption subsumes every possible form of deceit, deception, or conflict between 
persons – thus providing no definition at all! Second, the nature of the principal-agent 
relationship is completely different in the public as opposed to private sector. A civil servant is 
delegated authority by the entire society, through a political process – making infractions crimes 
against the body politik. A private individual enters into a formal or informal contract in a 
company or NGO, whereas the agent serves one or more principals – making infractions torts 
against private persons. Third, a definition of corruption should serve a specific legal function. 
Adequate legal definitions exist for the misuse of entrusted power in the private sector – as 
defined under fraud, theft, and other tort and/or criminal offenses. Until the mid-2000s, the field 
of anti-corruption focused on matters relating to the use of public power for private gain; while 
the field of corporate governance focused on issues relating to the misuse of entrusted resources 
in a private setting.   
 
If corruption is defined as the use of public power for private gain, the obvious question 
is whether gift-giving does (or should) constitute a corruption offense. In developing countries, 
gift-giving is an entrenched part of many types of interactions between civil servants and private 
individuals. Such gift-giving can help augment low civil servant salaries and provide incentives 
for more efficient service delivery (in a highly regulated civil service environment where civil 
servants often have few high-powered incentives to work hard). In order to help civil servants 
move away from a dogmatic definition of corruption, a simple test may help civil servants – and 
the members of an Internal Security Department or Ombundsman institution – define the 
difference between a gift and a bribe. The test consists of two parts: 
 
1. Has an extra payment been made for the quantity, quality, speed, friendliness and 
informativeness of a service which the service user has an administratively defined right to? 
 
2. Was the ex-post delivery of the public good or service made on the ex-ante expectation of an 
extra-payment?
36 
 
If the answer to both questions is affirmative, then the transaction involves corruption and if the 
answer to both questions is negative, then the transaction involves a legitimate gift.  
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See Amundsen (2000) for more on the definition and the various manifestations of corruption.   
36 This test roughly, though in much more simplified form, corresponds to the British standard as defined in 
the recent UK Fraud Act of 2006 (article 321 on corruption transactions with agents).    14
 
Absolute Integrity and Risk Management 
 
The response to fighting corruption in many countries has been to increase the 
amount of anti-corruption regulations. These regulations increase the amount of reporting 
which civil servants do – creating an “audit culture” which serves to demonstrate probity 
instead of supply of public goods and services.
37 Both Moldovan and Ukrainian border 
guard and customs services have adopted a wide range of measures to fight corruption 
including the dissemination of rules against taking bribes, psychometric testing of staff to 
test for psychological pre-dispositions toward corruption, bans on pocket money and the 
use of a personal mobile phone during working hours, and increased oversight of all staff 
by newly formed departments for Internal Security. With anti-corruption aid to both 
countries from the United States (of almost $50 million!), the amount of control will 
increase dramatically.  
 
Yet, the pursuit of “absolute integrity” in Anechiarico and Jacobs’ (1996) words, 
may harm the public administrations of both countries more than it helps them. First, 
each regulation increasingly distorts the action of civil servants and creates incentives to 
contravene these regulations. Second, these regulations cost money to create and to 
enforce – resulting in an often repeated case where grants of equipment and regulations 
(“developed through consensus with key stakeholders in order to promote participation 
and build political will”) lie unused after the donor team returns to headquarters. Third, 
regulations of this kind of deincentivise staff – resulting in work effort losses which are 
greater than the harms from petty bribery. Simply put, an anti-corruption regulation 
should be put in place when:  
 
             marginal                                          marginal                     marginal                            marginal  
     loss from corruption          >         creation of rents   +    cost of enforcement   +    reduced work effort .
 38
 
 
Instead of seeking to establish rigid rules, a system of guiding principles (such as 
the “contract test” previously referred to) and a system of random audit should be 
conducted for four reasons. First, controlling all goods goes against the basic tenants of 
economics (particularly those involving the gains from trade) as well as the principles 
enshrined in the European treaties. Second, a properly designed random audit will detect 
the same proportion of offenses as 100% inspection. Third, random audit frees up 
resources to be used for investigation. Indeed, an inverse relationship normally exists 
between inspection breadth and quality – namely the higher the percent of people or 
goods inspected, the lower is the quality of the inspection.
39 Fourth, (as previously 
mentioned), regulations potentially result in the creation of rents – thus reductions in 
regulations often result in decreases in incentive to seek bribes.  
                                                 
37 See Michael (2004b) for a further description of the audit culture and its impacts on public sector service 
delivery.  
38 Foreign aid to Moldova and Ukraine aimed at fighting corruption will significantly distort the incentives 
for right-regulating against corruption as both governments will be paid to implement a number of punitive 
measures against corruption which will make the programme benefit in the short-term higher than the cost 
imposed by efficiency reducing regulation.  
39 For an easy to understand instruction sheet for implementing a risk analysis approach in customs, see 
World Bank (2005).    15
 
Such a stratified random sampling procedure divides people or goods into similar 
groups representing similar risk levels — for example all consignments from Russia may 
have a statistically significantly different level of risk of under-valuation than those from 
France. Usually initial random sampling is used to arrive at these estimates.
40 Repeated 
sampling results in probabilities changing as the underlying risks change.
41 Such a 
random audit balances the expected gains from searching one group of people or goods 
versus randomly inspecting another group – or strata. Figure 14 shows the logic of 
differential random sampling. As shown in the graph, the first inspections of group A will 
have a significant benefit as obvious cases of under-valuation or contraband are found. 
As more inspection occurs, these marginal costs decrease. A similar logic applies to the 
inspection of group B – thus both marginal benefit curves slope downward. Clearly 
inspections could occur on group A to the point where the expected return to search 
group B (defined as the probability of detection multiplied by the value of the contraband 
or legal infraction found).  
 
Marginal benefit 
Of inspecting 
Group A
Marginal benefit 
Of inspecting 
Group B
Inspection Resources Dedicated to Group B Inspection Resources Dedicated to 
Group A
Total inspection resources
Figure 14: Choosing Sampling Frequencies for Various Populations
 
 
In order to detect cases of corruption, service staff can also undergo stratified 
random sampling and audit. As shown in Figure 15, the border guard or customs service 
staff may randomly audit differing strata of border crossers. Similarly, the Internal 
Security department may randomly audit service staff – based on the expected probability 
that they might be involved in corruption offenses. Naturally, the risk of service staff 
being corrupt is tied in some way to the probability that the individuals they are 
controlling are involved in legal infractions. Thus, the two tiered system described in 
Figure 15 addressed both regulatory risk as well as corruption risk.
42  
                                                 
40 Current data, based on 100% inspection is probably unreliable due to poor inspection quality concomitant 
with large-scale checking.  
41 For more on this approach, see UN (2004).  
42 While not discussed in this article, the careful reader will immediate observe that a hazard function for 
corruption for each civil servant can be roughly estimated by the sum of the expected risks of legal 
infraction multiplied by the rent (or bXt as discussed previously).    16
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  Such a risk management approach is increasingly common practice in the 
European Union. However, as government efficiency is higher in other countries, 
Ukraine and Moldovan Internal Security services need to play a developmental as well as 
supervisory function – by auditing for better performance as well as investigating for the 
possibility of corruption…as an Internal Security Department which seeks only to control 
corruption will have difficulties generating enough public value to continue.
43 Such 
activities could include Ombundsman’s functions, the regular conduct of service delivery 
surveys and training.  
The Optimal Location of Anti-Corruption Authority in an Executive Agency 
 
  Since the late 1990s, the international donors have financed work on the 
establishment of anti-corruption co-ordinating councils or agencies in a number of 
countries including Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Kenya and 
others. These Anti-Corruption Co-ordinating Councils (and in many cases anti-corruption 
agencies) were created because of the often complex nature of corruption cases. Figure 
16 shows the process of a corruption case.   
 
                                                 
43 Because of the increasing adoption of New Public Management concepts in government, public audit is 
seen like private audit. In a private company, an audit department must frequently show that its activities 
result in a greater cost reduction or reduction in business risks than the audit ties up in staff and other costs. 
In the same way, an internal audit in a public sector organization should aim at creating more public value 
than it costs to conduct the audit.     17
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Yet, the large variation we observe around the world in centering anti-corruption 
activity suggests that the optimal organizational structure for fighting corruption remains 
an open question. Figure 17 shows the various possible organizational forms for fighting 
corruption – and stylized facts do not point to the efficiency of one form over another.  
 
Figure 17: Various Anti-Corruption Organisational Arrangements 
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  However, theory provides a guide for thinking about the optimal organization 
structure for anti-corruption work.
44  Transaction cost economics argues that integration 
should occur between organizations – or organizational units – as the cost of writing, 
performing on and enforcing contracts between organizational units increases.
45 Such an 
effect militates for organizational integration because marginal benefits increase (to a 
point) as the centralization of anti-corruption activity occurs – cases do not need to cross 
departments or ministries and information can be shared more easily. Such an effect is 
shown as an upward sloping line in Figure 18a and labeled as a transactions cost effect.
46 
On the other hand, several salient results from organizational theory point to the benefits 
from specialisation of labour and tasks. Authors such as Kogut and Zander (1992) 
representing this tradition argue that integration serves only to combine competencies – 
and the development of these competencies in themselves should be left to specialized 
organizational units. In this view, as anti-corruption work becomes more integrated, the 
specific learning from each ministry decreases and the marginal benefits of such 
integration decrease as integration occurs. As shown in Figure 17a, such a capabilities 
effect is traced as a downward sloping line. The degree of integration of anti-corruption 
work should be at the point at which the marginal benefits from integration equal the 
marginal benefits from decentralization results in the optimal organizational structure for 
anti-corruption work.  
 
Figure 18a: The Optimal Degree of Centralisation of Anti-Corruption Work
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44 This section covers two very extensive literatures very quickly. The reader unfamiliar with these 
academic approaches should consult the relevant citations given in this paper for a further background.  
45 Transaction cost economics originally concerned itself with the question of why firms integrated instead 
of using arms-length contracts (Williamson (1985). Later work – particularly Jenson and Meckling (1990) 
– using a similar logic, sought to derive the optimal number of departments in an organisational unit.  
46 As Acemoglu (2003) notes, political transactions costs often represent a determinant transaction cost – 
particularly within a public sector context. Such political transactions costs – or the costs of obtaining 
settlements over differing views of public sector activity – are usually large relative to the cost of 
‘contracting’ across organizational boundaries in the public sector.    19
Naturally the factors underlying these transaction costs and competencies effects 
may change over time – or vary from country to country. Changes to the marginal 
benefits of integrating anti-corruption work (as underlying factors change) result in 
changes in the optimal degree of centralisation of anti-corruption activity. Figure 17b 
shows the results when underlying conditions change/differ. For example, if transactions 
costs change (political factionalism increases or a data protection act is passed which 
hinders the sharing of data across departments), then anti-corruption work should become 
more centralized. If competencies effects change – such that each department becomes 
better at developing and using anti-corruption knowledge), then the optimal amount of 
anti-corruption activity integration decreases.  
 
Figure 17b: Comparative Statics for the Optimal Degree of Centralisation of 
Anti-Corruption Work
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  While Figures 17 and 17b are purely illustrative, they provide intuitions needed to 
solve the problem of organisatonal structure in Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine has 
relatively fractious and highly politicized services, prone to centralized corruption. Thus, 
concentration of anti-corruption activity in a corruption free ministry is preferred to 
creating an anti-corruption agency or centralizing work in the office of the President or 
Prime Minister. Given extreme weaknesses in all law enforcement bodies, co-ordination 
of relatively efficient anti-corruption work across services would not be likely. Moldova 
having primarily disarticulated corruption has a co-ordinating committee – probably the 
most efficient organizational structure given existing costs and benefits of fighting 
corruption.
47 Given this model, over time the optimal anti-corruption structure will 
probably be a cross-border informal anti-corruption committee – covering border guard 
and customs services -- in which representatives from each service (as well as external 
donors and advisors) would meet. Ukraine and to a lesser extent Moldova already have 
                                                 
47 As an aside, this model explains other countries. Turkey’s public sector is extremely politically fractured, 
possessing a range of political and institutional interests – explaining why Turkish anti-corruption work has 
remained decentralized. In Bolivia, the transactions costs are extremely high for co-operating between 
under-funded ministries and few competencies existed in each service. However, instead of centralizing 
anti-corruption authority in the office of the Vice President (as the World Bank recommended and funded 
in 1997), work should have been concentrated in an independent anti-corruption unit.    20
such a structure at the national level. In support of the national anti-corruption co-
ordinating committee, a similar structure should be established for border guard and 
customs to review activity against corruption.  
Conclusions and Unresolved Questions 
 
  In some ways the experience over the last 20 years in Central and Eastern Europe 
provided useful cases of what not to do in Ukraine and Moldova.
48 The design of an anti-
corruption programme on the Transdnistrian border can not rely on more Action Planning 
and the adoption of international conventions by Ukrainian and Moldovan governments. 
A new system of anti-corruption regulations at the departmental level are also contra-
indicated. Instead, standard remedies from public sector reform offer the greatest remedy 
against administrative corruption on the Transdnistrian border. The implementation of a 
system of risk management and a coherent organisational form which is able to 
investigate and successfully prosecute corruption remains the bulwarks of effective anti-
corruption. In Ukraine and Moldova, the border guard and customs services are relatively 
autonomous entities which can enact reform quickly.  
 
  Yet, the Transdnistrian issue poses a particularly new situation for anti-corruption 
programme design for two reasons. First, the literature lacks models of public 
administrations in which one or two services can achieve dramatic decreases in 
corruption when the entire public sector management environment is corruption-ridden. 
Thus, work on the Transnistiran border will provide a useful case study for further work 
looking at department-specific dynamics of corruption. Second, the literature lacks 
convincing models of corruption which spills over from foreign territories – as corruption 
appears to do from the Transdnistrian region into both Ukraine and Moldova. The 
“import” of corruption is a tragically under-researched topic in the anti-corruption 
literature.    
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